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Abstract: Colloquial arguments for fish feeling pain are deeply rooted in anthropometric 
tendencies that confuse escape responses to noxious stimuli with evidence for 
consciousness. More developed arguments often rely on just-so stories of fish displaying 
complex behaviours as proof of consciousness. In response to commentaries on the idea 
that fish do not feel pain, I raise the need to go beyond just-so stories and to rigorously 
analyse the neural circuitry responsible for specific behaviours using new and emerging 
technologies in neuroscience. By deciphering the causal relationship between neural 
information processing and conscious behaviour, it should be possible to assess cogently 
the likelihood of whether a vertebrate species has the neural hardware necessary to — 
at least — support the feeling of pain.  
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Just-so stories 
 
In this response to commentaries on the target article “Fish do not feel pain” (Key), I do 
not plan to interrogate either the putative behavioural evidence or the just-so stories 
previously proposed as supportive of fish feeling pain (Balcombe; Braithwaite & 
Droege; Broom; Brown; Dinets; Ng). These claims have been adequately addressed 
and refuted in recent literature (Key, 2015a and 2015b; Rose et al., 2014). It is timely to 
be reminded of how just-so stories — like those suggesting that it is “obvious” that pain 
is evolutionary important for all vertebrates (Brown) or shared by many animals 
(Mather), and that active animals need a “certain level of pain” to survive (Broom) — 
can easily bias hypotheses and lead to scientists “fooling themselves” (Nuzzo, 2015). 
Balcombe’s just-so story about how he can easily “imagine a Tigerfish thinking of 
swallows as they prepare their next hunting foray” is not helpful to the debate. I intend 
to move forward and concentrate on the central issue proposed in my paper: that the 
structure of neural circuits determines the types of computations executed by these 
circuits and hence the behavioural outcomes. In doing so, I hope to provide a framework 
for the design of new experiments that more rigorously test hypotheses regarding fish 
and pain. 
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What my argument was not 
 
Some commentators incorrectly rearticulated my argument to suggest that any animal 
without a human cortex can neither exhibit complex behaviour nor feel pain 
(Balcombe; Braithwaite & Droege; Brown; Dinets; Haikonen; Jones; Manzotti; 
Mather; Ng; Striedter). This new and simplified version of my thesis was then 
subjected to interrogation by the laws of logic (Jones) as well as by “common sense” 
(Balcombe). It was supposedly debunked by analogies, such as jet aeroplanes can fly 
without propellers (Ng); and crickets must be deaf because they don’t have human ears 
(Dinets). It was supposedly also invalidated by decades of behavioural research 
demonstrating complex behaviours by many animals, including fish and birds, which 
lack cortices (Balcombe; Brown; Seth). One commentator proclaimed my approach 
was a mere fallacy (Haikonen). 
 
However, my thesis was never this simple. I clearly sought to define the neural 
substrates (both anatomical and physiological) that are prerequisites for the feeling of 
pain in humans. At no time did I say that either these structures or physiological 
processes were sufficient for pain, and present only in humans. It seems that the field 
was unprepared for the use of humans as a model system to inform on function in other 
animals. Interestingly, Mather warned against relying on what humans report when 
studying humans.  
 
Seth claimed that my thesis was “easily challenged by a wealth of evidence from non-
mammalian species like birds.” This evidence related to the complex behaviour 
displayed by these animals. While this statement, by itself, is not very compelling, it does 
relate to points raised by other commentators who suggested that birds may possess 
cortex-like neural architecture (Brown; Striedter; Dinets). Even though these 
commentators didn’t realise it, this is the very point I was arguing for in my paper. I did 
clearly articulate “only vertebrate nervous systems possessing all of the following 
neuroanatomical features are capable of feeling pain.” I proposed that within 
vertebrates, only those animals with such features are capable — at least — of feeling 
pain (i.e., those features are necessary but not sufficient). I have also raised this point in 
another recent article (Key, 2015a) and indicated, very succinctly, that birds appear to 
possess some of these prerequisite neural properties (even though they do not possess a 
cortex).  
 
Evidence from mammalian and avian brains supports the structure-function 
principle 
 
Previous evidence has revealed similarities in the laminar organization of the 
mammalian cortex and the gross organization of nuclei in the avian auditory pallium 
(Karten, 2013). This anatomical data is now being supplemented by physiological 
studies that support the basic premise of my structure-function argument as described 
in the target article.  
 
During primate and mouse vocalisations, there is motor cortex feedforward input (called 
corollary discharge) that suppresses the auditory cortex (Eliades and Wang, 2008; 
Nelson et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2014). This motor-elicited suppression involves a 
circuit consisting of excitatory motor cortical projection neurons terminating on 
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inhibitory interneurons in the auditory cortex. This neural mechanism seems to be very 
important in self-monitoring, vocal learning and distinguishing self from externally 
produced auditory inputs (Schneider and Mooney, 2015). Interestingly, songbirds have 
motor pallial projection neurons that also carry corollary discharge to the auditory 
pallium and this activity is involved in vocal learning. Thus, primates, mice and 
songbirds possess similar basic local and long-range circuitry in the auditory cortex and 
auditory pallium, and they share similar functional properties involved in specific 
hearing behaviours. 
 
Recently, the basic premise of the structure-function relationship was examined at the 
level of canonical microcircuits in the avian auditory pallium (Calabrese and Woolley, 
2015). Birds demonstrated hierarchical information processing, response features and 
population coding in the auditory pallium similar to that previously described in 
mammalian auditory cortex in response to auditory stimuli. These results support the 
idea that structurally analogous microcircuits perform similar high-level functions 
across these vertebrate species. Of course these structure-function relationships do not 
address whether the songbirds are consciously aware of their vocalisations. More 
detailed analyses obviously need to be completed in order to begin to understand 
whether such brain regions also support global integration and signal amplification 
underlying phenomenal consciousness. Nonetheless, these studies are providing 
positive signs that similar neural architectures can be used to predict analogous 
physiological functions and most likely high-level brain behaviours within the 
vertebrate lineage.      
 
Other-brain-regions argument 
 
A common dismissive approach to my argument was to claim that “other brain regions” 
are clearly able to produce the sensation of pain in fish. This proposition arises from the 
idea that throughout the animal kingdom many different anatomical structures seem to 
perform similar physiological functions. However, the anecdotes presented were 
typically simple and lacked critical insight. For instance, Manzotti noted that bats can fly 
without feathers. My response to such an analogy is that one needs to understand how 
feathers enable flight (e.g., what are their aerodynamical properties and how are they 
structurally arranged to produce flight). In this case, it is important to note that different 
feather structures as well as their particular arrangement can produce different flight 
behaviours in birds (Beaufrère, 2009; Xu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015). Moreover, birds 
and bats exhibit very different flying behaviours because of their different anatomies 
(Hedenström et al., 2007; Hedenström and Johansson, 2015). Once the fundamental 
aerodynamical principles of feathered flight have been characterised (just as I defined 
the fundamental neural principles in human pain), then one could search for their 
structural basis in other species (e.g., bats). That is, do bats have similar anatomical 
structures that permit feathered flight or do they produce a very different type of flight 
because of anatomical differences?  What proponents of the “other brain regions” 
argument fail to do is to progress their reasoning to a mechanistic level (both anatomical 
and physiological). Rather than understand how other brain regions could, or could not, 
lead to pain, they instead superficially treat these structures as “black boxes.”  
   
Striedter argues that homologous brain regions can perform different functions in 
different species. He cites the observation that fish can swim in the absence of the 
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telencephalon, but primates with motor cortex lesions are paralyzed. By inference, lower 
brain regions produce locomotion in fish, but not in humans, so perhaps fish can also 
feel pain within these regions. Once again it is imperative to interrogate the underlying 
neural architecture and circuitry in order to address this matter. Rhythmical locomotion 
in vertebrates depends on central pattern generators (Marder and Bucher, 2001; Jung 
and Dasen, 2015). Some of these generators are present in the brainstem and spinal 
cord, and their control is regulated to varying extents by higher-level circuitry in 
different species. The distinct body postures adopted by humans with lesions in 
different brain regions reveals that hierarchical control mechanisms modulate the spinal 
cord central pattern generators (Schepelmann, 1979). Nonetheless, the basic structure 
and function of these central pattern generators remain very similar across vertebrate 
species. For instance, when either a spinal dog or cat is placed in a harness to support 
their body weight, these pattern generators can be activated to generate locomotor 
behaviours. To conclude, as Striedter does, that fish lower brain regions and spinal 
cords are doing something remarkably different is merely misunderstanding the 
underlying anatomy. Once again, critical insight is gained by examining the neural 
structures in detail (as I argued in the target article). In fact, the cortical control of motor 
activity raised by Striedter is more consistent with the argument that the cortex has 
specialised neural functions.   
 
Rather than discuss the validity of my proposed anatomical and physiological 
prerequisites for pain, some commentators instead proposed that pain is such an 
important behaviour that it must be central to both the evolution of all vertebrates 
(Brown) and to the “flexible and adaptive behaviour” demonstrated by fish (Seth). 
Consequently, these just-so stories can lead to the conclusion that pain must have 
evolved early in the vertebrate lineage, and must be localised to an anatomical structure 
present in most, if not all, vertebrates. The phylogenetically old brainstem (Ng) and/or 
the midbrain tectum (Striedter) were presented as possible brain regions. Seth also 
suggested that fish pain was occurring in some “phylogenetically ancient brain region” 
with “alternate neuronal architectures.”  It is interesting that none of the commentators 
actually proposed what those alternate neural circuits could be in these ancient brain 
regions. One commentator went as far as to suggest that neural processes do not 
underlie pain (Manzotti). It needs to be pointed out that Braithwaite & Droege did 
acknowledge that both global integration and attentional amplification are “essential 
elements in consciousness” as I argued. Unfortunately, they then automatically assumed 
that the fish brain must possess the necessary neural architecture to execute these 
functions. 
 
Preoccupation with complex behaviours 
 
Some commentators argued that complex behaviours demonstrated by animals is clear 
evidence, in itself, of animal consciousness and hence their ability to feel pain. Many of 
these behaviours are presented as just-so stories, for example: the big grouper cleaning 
stations (Dinets), fish learning about food sources (Broom), tool use (Seth), bird-
hunting fish (Balcombe), nausea-causing taste aversion in goldfish (Striedter), and 
zebrafish learning from fear (Broom). Braithwaite & Droege have called for more 
behavioural measures to be used in order to further demonstrate conscious pain in fish. 
However, they mistakenly claim that I also advocate better tests (such as those involving 
the loss of normal behaviour) as evidence of pain. Unfortunately, my argument was 
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misinterpreted. What I actually demonstrated was that if such an approach were 
adopted (e.g., operations on fish involving craniotomy), it would be found insufficient. I 
also argued that some seemingly complex behaviours can be executed without the need 
of pain for motivation. One example I highlighted was the ability of a rodent spinal 
preparation to control leg position so as to prevent getting an electric shock.  
 
In his commentary, Hart raised the idea that there is a strong belief by some biologists 
that complex behaviour automatically implies consciousness. He suggested that this idea 
emerged from the subjective experience that consciousness seems to be central to 
human complex behaviours. Typically these complex behaviours are considered to be 
goal-directed and flexible (i.e., ability to modify behaviour in novel circumstances; 
Waskom et al., 2014). Since goal-directed behaviour is usually thought to involve the 
conscious appreciation of the relationship between a stimulus, a response (or action) 
and an outcome (Wokke et al., 2011; Zwosta et al., 2015), it becomes clear why fish 
behaviourists emphasise the ability of fish to perform complex behaviours as evidence 
for fish consciousness. Moreover, in many cases pursuing goals also seems tightly 
associated with being aware of (i.e., to feel) rewards and/or punishments (Dijksterhuis 
and Aarts, 2010). Consequently, questioning the idea that fish feel pain seems to be 
interpreted by some behaviourists as an attack on the ability of fish to perform complex 
behaviours. Breaking the link between goal pursuit and consciousness (Williams et al., 
2009; Wokke et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2012; de Pisapia, 2013; Tamir et al., 2013; 
Huang and Bargh, 2014) may lead to a new way of thinking about fish behaviour. In this 
respect, I would like to highlight recent research that is probing how some human 
behaviours, such as the placebo and nocebo effects as well as pain conditioning (which 
were previously considered to be dependent on conscious will or awareness) can be 
explained by nonconscious processes. These studies are clearly revealing that the link 
between the execution of complex behaviour and conscious expectancies or feelings is 
not necessary to explain outcomes (Jensen et al., 2012, 2015a and 2015b).       
 
Chella introduces a new line of experimental evidence that questions the need for 
conscious neural processing in fish behaviour. He discusses how robotic fish can 
perform complex behaviours based on automatic stimulus-response processing without 
cognitive architectures. However, he does carefully acknowledge that robotic fish are 
not real fish and what this research is showing, at least, is that adding the capacity of 
feeling to robotic fish may not change their behavioural repertoire. Nonetheless, 
robotics is an exciting area of research and recent advances in the autonomous 
behaviour of mobile animal-like robots (Bazeille et al., 2014) may in the future provide 
some novel insights into the types of neural processing required for complex animal 
behaviours. It is also important to highlight complementary research aimed at 
generating computational models of the human brain (Eliasmith et al., 2012; Rasmussen 
and Eliasmith, 2013). Such models are able to perform complex tasks involving memory, 
visual perception and reasoning and are built on the principles of brain-like neural 
information processing. If we assume that these stimulations are not conscious, then the 
mandatory link between awareness and complex behaviour dissolves.  
     
The way forward 
 
In addition to changing the way we think about associating consciousness and complex 
behaviours, it is imperative that the practice of representing brain regions as mysterious 
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black boxes is abandoned. I proposed that structure determines function and that this is 
applicable to the level of neural circuits controlling behaviours. Many commentators 
proposed (without evidence) that different structures (i.e., brain regions) can perform 
the same function. That is, the brainstem in fish can do what the cortex does in 
mammals. The field needs to move forward and go beyond this black-box approach to 
brain function and, at least, attempt to define the nature of the circuitry within the 
brainstem that is executing the computations proposed to be responsible for the feeling 
of pain. It is not enough to merely claim via analogy that “propellers” and “jet engines” 
do the same thing (Ng). If we persevere with the same analogy: where is, and what is, the 
“propeller” in the brainstem and how is it achieving the same function as the “jet engine” 
in the cortex.  
 
The present and next generation of fish behaviourists must be encouraged to embrace 
state-of-the-art neural recording and imaging approaches and molecular genetic 
manipulations that are allowing the dissection of the neural circuits responsible for 
mammalian behaviours (Choi et al., 2011; Franks et al., 2011; Gaykema et al., 2014; Land 
et al., 2014; Betley et al., 2015; Graebner et al., 2015; Vardy et al., 2015). It is an 
opportune time to combine electrophysiological and advanced microscopy techniques 
with neural circuit manipulation and mapping approaches to establish the causal link 
between neural activity and specific behaviours. Such strategies should cast light on 
what neural architectures underlie awareness and could possibly lead to novel ways of 
directly altering circuit function (Krug et al., 2015; Saunders et al., 2015) so as to 
modulate pain.   
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